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Abstract
This paper shows that utility di¤erences between the self-employed
and the employees increase with nancial development. This e¤ect is
not explained by increased prots but by an increased value of non-
monetary benets, in particular job independence. We interpret these
ndings by building a simple occupational choice model in which -
nancial constraints may impede rmscreation and depress labor de-
mand, thereby pushing some individuals into self-employment for lack
of salaried jobs. In this setting, nancial development favors a better
matching between individual motivation and occupation, thereby in-
creasing entrepreneurial utility despite increasing competition and so
reducing prots.
Keywords: Financial development; entrepreneurship; job satisfac-
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1 Introduction
From a standard economic viewpoint, the choice of becoming an entrepre-
neur displays some puzzling features. First, it is on average unprotable:
returns to capital are too low and risk too high (Hamilton, 2000; Moskowitz
and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). Second, it seems to deliver high utility: en-
trepreneurs often report higher levels of job satisfaction than employees with
similar characteristics (Blanchower and Oswald, 1998; Hundley, 2001; Benz
and Frey, 2004). A popular explanation to these puzzles posits that being an
entrepreneur gives substantial non-monetary benets and that, due to nan-
cial barriers to entry, entrepreneurs can enjoy utility above market clearing
(Blanchower and Oswald, 1998).
In this paper, we examine the above argument by exploring both theo-
retically and empirically how utility di¤erences between entrepreneurs and
employees respond to nancial development. In this way, our analysis may
contribute to a better understanding of occupational choices, as driven by
these utility di¤erences, in relation in particular to market conditions.
More specically, we rst build an occupational choice model in which
individuals can choose between becoming an entrepreneur, which requires
investing capital and hiring workers, or look for a job as an employee. The
model builds on two main ingredients. First, in addition to prots and wages,
individuals value also non-monetary dimensions of their job. For example,
entrepreneurs may derive utility from being their own boss.1 In line with the
evidence in Fuchs-Schündeln (2008), we assume that individuals may di¤er
in how much they like (or dislike) not having a boss, and so more generally
in their (intrinsic) motivation for becoming an entrepreneur.
The second key ingredient is that labor demand is bound by the amount
of individuals who become entrepreneurs. If entrepreneurs are a few, labor
demand is low and so is the probability of nding a salaried job. This may
push some individuals to become entrepreneurs by lack of better opportu-
nities.2 In this way, we incorporate the view that individuals may start
their businesses with very di¤erent motivations. On the one hand, they
may choose to be entrepreneurs, as it is typically the case in more developed
countries.3 On the other, they may become entrepreneurs by necessity. A
substantial fraction of entrepreneurs in developing countries falls into this
category (Reynolds, Bygrave, Autio, Cox and Hay, 2002), and these indi-
1See for example Taylor (1996), Blanchower and Oswald (1998), Hamilton (2000),
Benz and Frey (2004).
2 In most existing occupational choice models, instead, entrepreneurs have chosen to
be so and they could have become employees, while employees for some reason could not
become entrepreneurs. However, if this were the case, entrepreneurs would always be
better o¤ than employees, which seems at odds with the evidence mentioned next and it
will not be true in our data.
3See for example Parker (2004) and Bianchi and Henrekson (2005) for a review of such
class of models of entrepreneurship.
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viduals may be very happy to leave their businesses for a salaried job.4
We then explore the e¤ects of nancial development in such setting.
While the relation between nancial constraints and occupational choices
has received signicant attention (see Banerjee and Duo, 2005 and Levine,
2005 for recent surveys), we here focus on the rather unexplored aspect of
how nancial development may a¤ect individual utility, and in particular
the non-monetary returns from entrepreneurship. As mentioned above, and
as conrmed also in our analysis, such returns seem a crucial component of
entrepreneurial choices.
In our model, nancial development allows some poor to access credit
and set up a rm, which in turn increases competition and the demand for
labor. In this way, the poor and more motivated individuals can become
entrepreneurs, while the rich and less motivated individuals are induced to
look for a salaried job. It follows that higher levels of nancial development
are associated with more satised entrepreneurs, and this is the case even if
nancial development increases competition and so reduces prots. In fact,
in more nancially developed countries, individuals tend to have chosen to
be entrepreneurs because of their particular motivation rather than for lack
of a better job.
These predictions are tested by using individual data on job satisfaction
taken from the World Value Surveys, which provide comprehensive house-
hold surveys for a large set of countries over two decades. We focus on
self-reported levels of job satisfaction in order to account both for monetary
and non-monetary returns from a job, which is crucial in our framework
since prots and utility need not move in the same direction. Furthermore,
in addition to standard demographic variables, these data provide informa-
tion on beliefs, personality and di¤erent dimensions of individual jobs, which
permits to test whether nancial development works through these channels.
Finally, while most of the evidence on entrepreneursjob satisfaction comes
from OECD countries, these data cover a wide sample of developing and
developed country. This allows drawing a broader picture of whether entre-
preneurship has di¤erent meanings, and nancial development has di¤erent
e¤ects, according to a countrys stage of development.
Our main ndings lend support to the predictions of the model. First,
descriptive statistics show that entrepreneurs report higher levels of job sat-
isfaction than employees only in more nancially developed countries and
4See Banerjee and Duo (2008) for a detailed account of this view in developing coun-
tries and Reynolds, Bygrave, Autio, Cox and Hay (2002) for comprehensive surveys on
necessity vs. opportunity entrepreneurs. Relatedly, see the literature on formality vs. in-
formality (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Loayza, 1994; Schneider and Enste, 2000) and survival
vs. growth enterprises (Berner, Gomez and Knorringa, 2008). On developed countries, see
the literature on self-employment as a way out unemployment (e.g. Evans and Leighton,
1989; Glocker and Steiner, 2007; Andersson and Wadensjö, 2007), and as a response to
labor market discrimination (Borjas, 1986).
3
that, in these countries, entrepreneurs tend to report lower income than em-
ployees. These patterns are conrmed in a more structured analysis in which
we control for a set of individual variables and for country-year xed e¤ects.
It emerges that entrepreneurial utility, relative to the one of employees, in-
creases with nancial development. This result is robust to the inclusion
of additional macroeconomic variables, accounting for example for better
institutions or economic perspectives, as well as to the use of alternative
measures of nancial development. Moreover, this e¤ect appears stronger
in less nancially developed countries, where many individuals become en-
trepreneurs by necessity and so many would be happy to switch to a salaried
employment.
Finally, we explore which mechanisms may underlie such relation. We
rst notice that adding income among the explanatory variables does not
change our results. Income appears (as expected) a strong determinant of
job satisfaction, but higher nancial development does not increase entre-
preneursutility by making them richer. On the other hand, the e¤ect of
nancial development becomes insignicant once we control for the degree
of independence enjoyed in the job. This suggests that higher nancial de-
velopment allows entrepreneurs to enjoy higher non-monetary benets, and
in particular higher freedom in taking decisions in their job.
We present our model and theoretical analysis in Sections 2 and 3, re-
spectively; Section 4 describes our data and Section 5 reports the empirical
results; Section 6 concludes by discussing some policy implications. Omitted
proofs and tables are reported in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider an economy populated by a unitary mass of risk-neutral individ-
uals. Each individual is characterized by a type (a; b); where a describes
his initial wealth and b his taste for being an entrepreneur (which for now
we simply call motivation). Wealth is drawn from a smooth cumulative dis-
tribution function F with density f ; motivation from a smooth cumulative
distribution function G with density g. These draws are assumed to be sta-
tistically independent. In addition, each individual is endowed with one unit
of labor, which he may employ either for setting up a rm or to work as an
employee. We now describe these options in further detail.
2.1 Options
First, an individual can set up a rm. We assume that each rm produces
the same homogeneous good and it has the same size: it employs k units of
capital, l workers, and it produces q units of output. The prot is then
 = pq   wl   rk; (1)
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where p denotes the price of the good, w denotes workerswage, and r is the
market interest rate. In addition, managing a rm gives utility b. Hence, an
individual who sets up a rm enjoys utility
U1 =  + b: (2)
These individuals are called entrepreneurs, and we denote their population
share with x1. As a second option, an individual can look for a job in one
of these rms. If he is hired, he enjoys utility
U2 = w:
The population share of workers is denoted with x2: If he is not hired, he
remains idle and enjoys some utility which we normalize to zero.
2.2 Markets
There are three markets in our economy: a labor market, a product market
and a credit market. In the labor market, the wage w is bounded below by
w, which implies that such market may display excess supply. In such case,
each applicant has the same probability of getting a job.5 The number of
workers equals rmsdemand, so we have
x2 = lx1: (3)
The product market is described by a decreasing inverse demand function
p = P (Q); (4)
where Q = x1q denotes the total output produced in the economy. Entre-
preneurs take the price p as given, and inelastically supply their output.
The nancial market is competitive, the interest rate r is xed and ex-
ogenous, and we normalize it to one. An individual with wealth a can ask for
a loan (k a) in order to set up a rm: However, ex-post moral hazard limits
the maximum size of such loan. Since, at cost c; such individual can renege
on his loan contract and run away with the money, the required repayment
(k   a) cannot exceed c. Hence, only individuals with enough wealth can
set up a rm, and we dene such lower bound on wealth as
a  k   c: (5)
The threshold a decreases with c, which measures how easy it is to enforce
loan contracts and so it is an indicator of nancial development.6
5More sophisticated reasons for non-market clearing wages are for example in Weiss
(1980) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
6Our formalization of nancial market imperfections is very similar to the one in Baner-
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2.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, each individual, given his type, chooses an option in or-
der to maximize his expected utility and the markets function according to
equations (3), (4) and (5). In such equilibrium, there is no option for an
individual with wealth lower than a than to look for a job as worker. An
individual with wealth greater than a and motivation b instead prefers to
set up a rm if and only if
pq   wl   rk + b  lx1
1  x1w; (6)
which implicitly denes a lower bound on b as
b  wl
1  x1 + rk   pq: (7)
Provided that an equilibrium exists, the share of entrepreneurs x1 is implic-
itly dened by
x1 = [1  F (a)][1 G(b)]: (8)
This equation also characterizes labor supply (1   x1) and, by equation
(3), the share of workers x2 = lx1. We are then interested in identifying
the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in our
economy.
3 Analysis
To show that an equilibrium exists and it is unique, we rst notice that the
right hand side of equation (7) decreases in b: In fact, an higher b leads to
a lower share of entrepreneurs x1 and so to an higher labor supply (1  x1)
and to an higher price p (since total output Q increases in x1): This implies
that equation (7) uniquely denes b:
Moreover, the minimal motivation of those who prefer running a rm
increases with the share of entrepreneurs x1. In fact, an higher x1 reduces
the incentive to set up a rm both because it reduces the price p and because
it increases the demand for workers and so the probability of being hired.7
This is expressed in the next Lemma.
Lemma 1 The minimal entrepreneurial motivation b is increasing in the
share of entrepreneurs x1.
jee and Newman (1993). The fact that only su¢ ciently wealthy individuals get loans is a
very common feature in nancial markets and it can be also derived in a model of moral
hazard à la Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) or costly screening.
7While one may think also to positive externalities among rms, we show that, even
abstracting from them, entrepreneurs may report higher payo¤s when more rms are
created.
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It follows from Lemma 1 that the right hand side of equation (8) de-
creases in x1, and thus equation (8) uniquely denes the share of entrepre-
neurs x1: We summarize with the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium exists and it is unique. It is dened by equa-
tions (3) and (8).
3.1 Financial Development, Prots and Job Satisfaction
We are then interested in analyzing how nancial development a¤ects utility
di¤erences between entrepreneurs and workers. In particular, we consider
how these e¤ects may depend on a countrys stage of development and how
they may di¤er along monetary and non-monetary dimensions of individual
utility.8 The average utility of an entrepreneur can be decomposed as the
sum of prot
 = pq   wl   rk;
and average non-monetary benet
b =
1
1 G(b)
Z
bb
bg(b)db: (9)
Utility di¤erences are dened as
D =  +b  w: (10)
Di¤erentiating equation (10) with respect to c; we write the e¤ects of nan-
cial development on utility di¤erences D as
@D
@c
=
@p
@c
q   @w
@c
(1 + l) +
@b
@c
: (11)
In order to interpret equation (11), we rst notice that, by relaxing wealth
constraints, nancial development allows an higher fraction of individuals to
pay the cost of setting up a rm. The share of entrepreneurs then increases
in nancial development, up to the point at which everyone is employed
either as a worker or as an entrepreneur, i.e. x1 + lx1 = 1. We show this in
the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 There exists a level of nancial development c such that the
share of entrepreneurs x1 increases in c for c < c and it is x1 = 1=(1 + l)
for all c  c:
It follows that utility di¤erences between entrepreneurs and workers tend
to be higher in more nancially developed countries. By equation (6) it must
8Obviously, we are only considering the case in which c < k; so indeed nancial devel-
opment has an e¤ect.
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be that, for all those who become entrepreneurs,
U1  lx1
(1  x1)U2: (12)
Given Lemma 1, the share of entrepreneurs is low when nancial develop-
ment is low. In this case, many individuals choose to be entrepreneurs even
if they would prefer to be workers, since labor demand is low and so the
probability of being hired is small. Hence, in countries with low nancial
development, entrepreneurship may come from the necessity of nding a
job rather than from the choice of highly motivated individuals. In these
countries, then, entrepreneurs need not be more satised with their job than
employees. When nancial development is high, instead, x1 = 1=(1+ l) and
so U1  U2 for all those who become entrepreneurs. This implies that utility
di¤erences between entrepreneurs and workers are positive.
We then turn to the e¤ect of nancial development on prots and wages.
For c < c; higher nancial development increases labor demand, but the
wage remains at its minimum w as there is still excess labor supply: Total
production also increases (as less individuals end up idle), and this reduces
the price p and so the prot: For c  c; the share of entrepreneurs is con-
stant, and so is the price, while the wage increases as more people compete
for attracting workers. This is shown more formally in the next Lemma.
Lemma 3 For c < c; the price p decreases with c and the wage w is con-
stant at w; for c  c; the price p is constant and the wage w increases with
c.
Last, we look at the e¤ects of nancial development on b; which describes
the non-monetary dimensions of individual utility. These e¤ects depend on
how the minimal motivation b varies with c. For c < c; b increases both
as prots decrease (via product market competition) and as the probability
of being hired increases. For c  c; b still increases (though possibly less
than for c < c) since labor market competition increases the wage. Hence,
nancial development allows the poor with high motivation to become en-
trepreneurs and induces those with low motivation to exit and look for a
job as employees. The following Proposition summarizes these predictions,
which we test in the next Section.
Proposition 2
a. Entrepreneurs enjoy higher utility than employees only in more nan-
cially developed countries.
b. Entrepreneurial prots  decrease with nancial development.
c. Entrepreneurial non-monetary benets b increase with nancial develop-
ment, and this e¤ect may be stronger when nancial development is low.
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4 Testing the Model
We are interested in exploring the e¤ects of nancial development on the
utility of entrepreneurs relative to workers. In particular, in line with the
interpretation suggested by the previous model, we look at the e¤ects of
nancial development both on income and on non-monetary components of
individual utility, and we test whether these e¤ects depend on the countrys
stage of development.
It should already be noticed, however, that we are going to estimate the
changes in utility within the group of entrepreneurs relative to the group
of workers, but indeed the composition of these groups may change with
nancial development. In other words, we do not estimate the e¤ects on
the same individuals, but rather the e¤ects on a representative individual
within a group over time and across countries.
4.1 Data
In most of our analysis, the dependent variable is the self-reported level of
job satisfaction. While money need not be the only argument of individual
utility, job satisfaction should provide a broader indicator of both monetary
and non-monetary returns from a job.9 Specically, we consider a 1 to
10 index based on the answer to the question: "Overall, how satised or
dissatised are you with your job?" Such variable is taken from the World
Value Surveys (WVS), and it is available for 46 countries over the period
1981   2001. In total, we have 50978 individual observations for full time
employees and 7010 for self-employed, divided into 88 country-year groups.10
In addition, for each individual, information are provided on demographic
characteristics, income, employment status, and several variables describing
beliefs, personality and di¤erent dimensions of his or her job.
As indicator of nancial development in a given country and year, we
use the level of domestic credit to the private sector, as percentage of GDP.
The variable is taken from the World Development Indicators, published by
the World Bank. This is the most commonly used indicator in the litera-
ture on nance and growth (see Levine, 2005), and it seems well suited for
our purposes as well. It reects the availability of bank credit, which is a
fundamental ingredient to ease the creation of new enterprises. In our sam-
ple, nancial development displays a considerable variation both within and
across countries, ranging from 1:68 (Poland, 1989) to 195:98 (Japan, 1990).
In addition, we use other macroeconomic variables such as per capita
GDP, GDP growth, unemployment, regulation and bank ownership. A more
9This assumption will be validated empirically. We will see that income is a major
determinant, but not the only determinant, of job satisfaction.
10The surveys were conducted in four waves (in the early 80s, early 90s, late 90s, and
early 2000s) and not all countries were included in all waves.
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detailed description and summary statistics of all our variables can be found
in the Appendix.
5 Empirical Evidence
5.1 Descriptive Evidence
As suggested by our model, the self-employed need not enjoy greater utility
than employees: in less nancially developed countries, self-employment can
be a way to avoid unemployment. To get a rst picture of where the status
of self-employed is a signicant determinant of ones job satisfaction, we
estimate the following equation separately for each country and year:
Ui = + Xi + SEi + "i: (13)
The dependent variable Ui denotes the individual job satisfaction, Xi is a
set of individual variables including gender, age, age-squared, education,
marital status, and SEi is a dummy equal to one if i is self-employed. If in
a given country in a given year the self-employed enjoy higher utility, then
the coe¢ cient  should be positive.
Table 2 reports the estimates of the coe¢ cient  for each country and
year. It is clear that the self-employed are not always more satised than the
employees, but this tends to be the case only in more developed countries.
Moreover, the results remain basically unchanged if income is included in
the set of controls Xi (columns 4-6). In fact, the set of countries and years in
which the self-employed enjoy higher utility becomes slightly larger, which
already suggests that income di¤erentials are not the explanation behind
di¤erences in job satisfaction.
In order to highlight these relationships, we construct the following vari-
ables. The variable HAPPY is a dummy equal to one if  is positive and
signicant at the 5% level. We also run a similar regression with income
as dependent variable in equation (13). Given this regression, we construct
the dummy RICH which equals one if  is positive and signicant at the
5% level, and the dummy POOR which equals one if  is negative and
signicant at the 5% level.
As shown in Table 3, the variable HAPPY is positively correlated with
nancial development, GDP per capita and POOR and it is negatively
correlated with RICH: In accordance with our model, the self-employed
enjoy higher utility than the employees in countries with high GDP per
capita and high nancial development. Moreover, in these countries, the
self-employed tend to have a lower income than the employees.
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5.2 Job Satisfaction and Financial Development
The previous results suggest that utility di¤erences are not due to nancial
market imperfections. We now explore this argument more systematically.
We rst estimate the equation
Ui;c;t = + Xi;c;t + Ic;t + FDc;t  SEi;c;t + "i;c;t; (14)
where Ui;c;t denotes the reported job satisfaction for an individual i in coun-
try c and year t; Xi;c;t is a set of individual variables including gender,
age, age-squared, education, marital status and employment status; Ic;t is a
country-year dummy, FDc;t is the level nancial development and SEi;c;t is
a dummy equal to one if i is self-employed; nally, "i;c;t is the error term.11
Equation (14) follows the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998), and it
allows to estimate the e¤ect of nancial development on a particular set of
individuals, the self-employed, after having controlled for the e¤ect on the
whole population and for country-year xed e¤ects. Our main interest is in
the coe¢ cient ; which describes how nancial development a¤ects the job
satisfaction of the self-employed relative to (full-time) employees.12 When
 is positive, we say that nancial development is positively correlated with
entrepreneurial utility.
Table 4 reports our estimates on the full sample. The rst column in-
cludes only the controlsXi;c;t. Self-employed, old, married and well-educated
individuals tend to be more satised with their job. The second column
describes our most basic specication, as reported in equation (14). The
coe¢ cient  is positive and statistically signicant. Financial development
benets the self-employed more than the employees.
In order to check the robustness of this result, we rst try to identify
whether nancial development is capturing any e¤ect of better macroeco-
nomic conditions, like better institutions or economic perspectives, which
may have a di¤erential impact on the self-employed. When we include GDP
per capita, interacted with the employment status dummy, the e¤ect of
nancial development becomes slightly weaker, but still highly signicant
(column 3). Adding other macroeconomic variables like GDP growth (col-
umn 4), unemployment (column 5), and an index of regulatory pressure
(column 6), always interacted with the self-employment dummy, does not
change the estimate of . Hence, our preferred specication, which serves as
the baseline for the next analysis, is the one in column (3).
11Since these errors may reect common components within countries and employment
status groups, we cluster standard errors at the country/employment status level.
12To ease the interpretation of our coe¢ cients, part-time employees and farmers are
excluded from the analysis. These exclusions do not change our results. For the same
reason, in what follows, we report the estimates from OLS regressions. The results using
ordered probit are qualitatively the same. (see Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters, 2004 for a
methodological discussion.)
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We then check whether this pattern is conrmed when using an alterna-
tive measure of the development of the banking sector, which is a condition
for bank credit availability. As in Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta (2007), we
employ a variable based on the percentage of bank deposits held in privately
owned banks (BANK). The results in column 7 show that also this measure
of nancial development is positively correlated with entrepreneurial utility.
Our second set of regressions estimates whether the e¤ect of nancial
development depends on the countrys stage of development. We divide the
sample into countries-years with high and with low nancial development,
where such threshold is determined by the median value in our sample.13
The results are in columns (1)-(2) of Table 5: the e¤ects of nancial de-
velopment on entrepreneurial utility are positive and signicant only in less
developed countries.
Our model suggests a possible explanation for this result. In less de-
veloped countries, individuals become self-employed either because of their
motivation or for lack of salaried jobs. As these countries develop their -
nancial system, more jobs are created so only those who value it the most
remain self-employed. This composition e¤ect is weaker in more developed
countries, where labor demand is higher and so most individuals become self-
employed by choice. Indeed, we get similar ndings if we split the sample
according to GDP per capita (columns 3-4) or to unemployment (columns 5-
6). The e¤ect of nancial development on entrepreneurial utility is stronger
in countries where GDP per capita is low and unemployment is high. Fi-
nally, in order to better highlight the nonlinearity in the e¤ects of nancial
development, column (7) includes the level of nancial development squared
and cube. The rst appears to be negative, the second positive, and both
are signicant.
From these results, it is evident that the self-employed enjoy higher util-
ity than the employees only in countries with high nancial development;
in less developed countries, entrepreneurial utility increase with nancial
development. In highly developed countries, approximately those above the
sample median, the e¤ect of nancial development is U-shaped, and it ap-
pears not statistically signicant if one applies a linear model.
5.3 Mechanisms
We now explore the mechanisms underlying the relation between nancial
development and entrepreneurial utility. As stressed in our model, these
mechanisms should not be evaluated only in monetary terms.
We start by enriching the set of regressors in equation (14). First, we
control for income, both in the full sample and separating countries-years
according to their level of nancial development. As shown in columns (1)-
13Splitting the sample according to the mean gives the same qualitative results.
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(3) of Table 6, if anything, the results are even stronger. Income appears to
be a major determinant of job satisfaction; but, as documented also in Benz
and Frey (2004), higher income does not explain entrepreneurial utility. In
addition to the existing literature, we document that the e¤ects of nancial
development on entrepreneurial utility are not only monetary.14
Indeed, by estimating equation (14) with income as dependent variable,
we notice that the self-employed are richer than the employees in less de-
veloped countries, while this is not the case in more developed countries
(columns 1-2 of Table 7). Moreover, nancial development decreases the in-
come of the self-employed, relative to employees (column 3), and this e¤ect
tends to be stronger in less developed countries (columns 4-5). The fact that
nancial development reduces prots is consistent with our model in that
nancial development increases competition, either in the product or in the
labor market.
The results in columns (4)-(5) of Table 7 and those in columns (1)-(2) of
Table 5 are used to draw Figure 1, which summarizes our main results so far.
It clearly emerges that the e¤ects of nancial development on entrepreneurial
utility may di¤er from those on prot; actually, in our case, these e¤ects go
exactly in the opposite direction. Entrepreneurial utility increases while
prot decreases with nancial development, and both e¤ects tend to be
stronger in less developed countries.
The above results suggest that nancial development works through non-
monetary aspects of job satisfaction. In the attempt to better identify these
mechanisms, we include in our regressions variables like the degree of pride
in the work, the satisfaction with job security, the degree of independence
enjoyed in the job. We also control for work-related beliefs like how much
work is important in life, the main reason why one works, and so on. None
of these variables signicantly a¤ects our results, with the exception of inde-
pendence, that is an indicator derived from the question: "How free are you
to make decisions in your job?" The importance of this variable in explaining
entrepreneurial utility was already pointed out in Benz and Frey (2004), and
indeed, also in our sample, being self-employed becomes negatively related
to job satisfaction once one adds this control (Table 6, column 4).
We notice that, once controlling for independence, the e¤ect of nan-
cial development becomes almost half in magnitude and not statistically
signicant (column 5). Hence, our results add to the existing evidence by
documenting that most of the e¤ects of nancial development seems to work
through this channel. According to the model, this is the case since nan-
cial development o¤ers to the most motivated individuals the opportunity
to become entrepreneurs. Indeed, these results suggest that what we have
14Notice that while income underreporting may be more of an issue for the self-employed,
this may explain our results only if underreporting was higher in more nancially developed
countries.
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Figure 1: Entrepreneurial Prot, Utility and Financial Development.
Estimates from Table 5, Columns (1)-(2) and Table 7, Columns (4)-(5).
so far called motivation may be (broadly) dened in terms of taste for inde-
pendence at work. Moreover, notice that the coe¢ cient on independence in
less developed countries is lower than in more developed countries (columns
5 and 6).15 This suggests that, as in our model, in more developed country
independence is given to those who value it the most.
6 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper shows that nancial development increases utility di¤erences be-
tween the self-employed and the employees. This e¤ect is not explained by
increased prots; rather, it seems to work through non-monetary dimensions
of job satisfaction, and in particular independence. We have interpreted
these ndings by building a simple occupational choice model in which -
nancial development favors both job creation and a better matching between
individual motivation and occupation.
We wish to conclude by suggesting some possible policy implications of
our analysis. We started by presenting the argument that entrepreneurs
enjoy higher utility than employees due to a lack of nancial development,
and showed that such argument is not supported by the data. According to
our results, the existence of such utility di¤erences is not due to some market
15This di¤erence is signicant at the 5% level.
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imperfection, and as such it does not in itself call for policy intervention.
Second, our analysis of utility di¤erences has allowed to formalize the
view that self-employment is a rather heterogeneous concept, which indi-
viduals may access with very di¤erent motivations. Exploring these moti-
vations may be important to understand market behaviors. For example,
many self-employed in less nancially developed countries may view their
occupation as temporary, and as such they may be reluctant to invest in long
term projects, however e¢ cient these projects may be. Such understanding
seems then crucial for assessing entrepreneurspotential for job creation and
growth, and so ultimately for guiding policy interventions.
Finally, we have shown that nancial development a¤ects also non-
monetary dimensions of entrepreneurial utility. This insight suggests that
recognizing the importance of entrepreneursintrinsic motivation does not
imply that external conditions do not matter. On the contrary, this paper
shows how intrinsic motivation is a¤ected by market conditions. A broader
investigation on how di¤erent markets and institutions a¤ect non-monetary
returns from a job appears a very interesting and highly unexplored avenue
for future research.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Omitted Proofs
Lemma 1 The minimal entrepreneurial motivation b is increasing in the
share of entrepreneurs x1.
Proof. With simple algebra, di¤erentiating equation (7), one can write
@b
@x1
=
wl
(1  x1)2  
@p
@x1
q:
This expression is positive since the rst term is positive (notice that x1 may
increase only if lx1 + x1 < 1; i.e. there is excess labor supply and w = w,
which implies that w does not depend directly on x1) and the second term
is negative (Q increases in x1 and so p decreases in x1):
Lemma 2 There exists a level of nancial development c such that
the share of entrepreneurs x1 increases in c for c < c and it is x1 = 1=(1+l)
for all c  c:
Proof. Suppose rst that lx1 + x1 < 1; i.e. there is excess labor supply
and w = w: Implicitly di¤erentiating equation (8), we have
@x1
@c
=
f(a)[1 G(b)]
1 + [1  F (a)]g(b) @b@x1
:
The numerator measures the increment in individuals who can a¤ord to
become entrepreneurs. The denominator tells how the mass of individuals
who are su¢ ciently motivated and so willing to be entrepreneurs changes as
entry increases. Given Lemma 1, @b=@x1 is positive and hence @x1=@c is
also positive. Hence, x1 is strictly increasing in c for lx1+ x1 < 1: Let c be
the minimal c such that x1 = 1=(1 + l): Beyond c; x1 cannot increase any
further since everyone is employed either as a worker or as an entrepreneur.
Lemma 3 For c < c; the price p decreases with c and the wage w is
constant at w; for c  c; the price p is constant and the wage w increases
with c.
Proof. Given Lemma 2, x1 is strictly increasing in c for c < c: The
total output produced Q = x1q depends positively on x1 hence for equation
(4) the price p decreases with x1: The wage w instead does not depend on
x1; since x1 can increase only if there is excess labor supply and so w = w:
For c  c; x1 is xed and so p is xed; w instead is such that demand equals
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supply of labor, i.e. L = 1   x1   lx1  0: Implicitly di¤erentiating L, we
have
@w
@c
=  @L
@c
=
@L
@w
=
f(a)[1 G(b)]
[1  F (a)]g(b)(1 + l) > 0:
Proposition 2
a. Entrepreneurs enjoy higher utility than employees only in more nan-
cially developed countries.
b. Entrepreneurial prots  decrease with nancial development.
c. Entrepreneurial non-monetary benets b increase with nancial develop-
ment, and this e¤ect may be stronger when nancial development is low.
Proof. Recall from equation (12) that
U1  lx1
1  x1U2:
If c is low, then x1 is low and so there are many entrepreneurs for which
U1 < U2: These are the individuals with motivation b 2 [b; b]; where b
is such that  + b = w: If c  c; then lx1 = 1   x1 and U1  U2 for
all entrepreneurs. Part b. of the Proposition follows from Lemma 3: as c
increases, either p decreases or w increases, hence the prot  = pq wl  k
decreases with c. Finally, from equation (9), we have
@b
@c
=
g(b)
1 G(b)(
b  b)@b

@c
:
From equation (7), we see that b increases in x1 and p and it decreases in w
so, given Lemmas 1, 2 and 3, @b=@c > 0. This implies that b increases in c:
Notice also that this e¤ect may be stronger for c < c; when b increases in
c both as the result of reduced prot and of an higher probability of being
hired (an higher lx1=(1  x1)). For c  c; instead, only the rst e¤ect is at
play.
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7.2 Description of variables
Individual-level variables:
Job Satisfaction: 1-10 index based on the answer to "Overall, how sat-
ised or dissatised are you with your job?" 10 indicates "satised", 1 indi-
cates "dissatised". Source: WVS, variable c033.
SE: Dummy equal 1 if the individual is self-employed. Source: WVS,
variable x028.
Female: Dummy equal 1 if the individual is a female. Source: WVS,
variable x001.
Age: Age of the individual. Source: WVS, variable x003.
Married: Dummy equal 1 if the individual is married or living together
as married. Source: WVS, variable x007.
Education: 1-10 index for the age at which the individual completed
education. 1 indicates the individual was less than 13 years old, 10 indicates
the individuals was more than 20 years old. Source: WVS, variable x023r.
Income: 1-11 index of the individual income scale. Source: WVS, vari-
able x047.
Independence in job: 1-10 index based on the answer to "How free are
you to make decisions in your job?" 10 indicates "a great deal", 1 indicates
"none at all". Source: WVS, variable c034.
Macro-level variables:
FD: Financial Development, measured by the level of domestic credit
to the private sector (% of GDP). Source: World Development Indicators.
(available at www.worldbank.org/data)
GDP: GDP per capita (at constant 2000 US$). Source: World Develop-
ment Indicators. (available at www.worldbank.org/data)
UNEMPL: Total unemployment (% of total labor force). Source: World
Development Indicators. (available at www.worldbank.org/data)
REGULAT: 0-10 variable rating the regulation of credit markets, la-
bor markets and businesses. 0 corresponds to stronger state intervention.
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Source: Economic Freedom of the World: 2007 Annual Report. (available
at www.freetheworld.com)
GROWTH: GDP per capita growth (annual %). Source: World Devel-
opment Indicators. (available at www.worldbank.org/data)
BANK: 0-10 variable based on the percentage of bank deposits held
in privately owned banks. Countries with larger shares of privately held
deposits received higher ratings. Source: Economic Freedom of the World:
2007 Annual Report. (available at www.freetheworld.com)
7.3 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Job Satisfaction 67348 7.297039 2.182215 1 10
SE 65999 .1062137 .3081133 0 1
Female 67288 .4372399 .4960492 0 1
Age 67193 38.48615 12.25545 16 100
Married 67100 .6798361 .4665429 0 1
Education 60816 6.730318 2.719934 1 10
Income 57479 5.53122 2.410663 1 11
Independence 66691 6.571516 2.68442 1 10
FD 62248 66.83599 38.53845 1.68 195.98
GDP 65197 13311.15 9797.721 317 43267
UNEMPL 43829 8.398348 4.252513 .6 16.4
REGULAT 62491 5.326551 1.204252 2.5 8.3
GROWTH 64627 1.231817 4.798632 -14.57 12.67
BANK 62021 5.678464 3.725851 0 10
Note: The table reports summary statistics for all variables used
in the regressions. A denition of these variables can be found in
Section 7.2.
21
Table 2: Job Satisfaction across countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country Year SE SE Obs Self-Empl Std Error Obs
Argentina 1991 0,218 0,118 356 0,270 0,140 276
Austria 1990 0,021 0,112 689 0,049 0,116 663
Austria 1999 0,139 0,117 762 0,182 0,144 623
Belarus 2000 -0,232 0,204 636 -0,451 0,208 630
Belgium 1981 0,189 0,159 503 0,104 0,185 429
Belgium 1990 0,145 0,080 1282 0,099 0,107 825
Belgium 1999 0,183 0,129 836 0,318 0,146 711
Brazil 1991 0,073 0,097 797 0,092 0,100 764
Bulgaria 1990 0,080 0,186 414 -0,019 0,256 650
Bulgaria 1999 0,078 0,244 693 -0,024 0,199 397
Canada 1982 0,537 0,249 657 0,669 0,277 573
Canada 1990 0,363 0,129 1004 0,482 0,143 876
Chile 1990 -0,025 0,109 520 0,012 0,110 518
China 1990 -0,001 0,097 567 -0,024 0,098 560
Croatia 1999 -0,249 0,180 474 -0,362 0,193 459
Czech Republic 1990 0,192 0,269 610 0,158 0,270 607
Czech Republic 1991 0,287 0,142 1371 0,296 0,148 1322
Czech Republic 1999 0,409 0,114 981 0,379 0,121 891
Denmark 1981 0,338 0,168 674 0,299 0,179 622
Denmark 1990 0,280 0,140 639 0,564 0,180 571
Denmark 1999 0,914 0,207 627 0,768 0,218 578
Estonia 1990 0,073 0,296 768 0,061 0,297 767
Estonia 1999 0,293 0,167 575 0,313 0,218 494
Finland 1990 0,197 0,151 424 -0,022 0,031 424
Finland 2000 0,163 0,148 490 0,222 0,153 449
France 1981 0,500 0,149 588 0,712 0,198 465
France 1990 0,228 0,237 453 0,176 0,338 389
France 1999 0,224 0,227 736 0,166 0,278 610
Germany 1990 0,476 0,119 2124 0,479 0,125 2045
Germany 1999 0,055 0,117 862 0,106 0,173 607
Greece 1999 0,136 0,122 644 0,046 0,134 563
Hungary 1991 0,063 0,283 552 0,059 0,283 544
Hungary 1999 0,012 0,287 420 -0,118 0,301 409
Iceland 1984 0,168 0,107 679 0,175 0,112 642
Iceland 1990 0,201 0,107 559 0,046 0,022 434
Iceland 1999 0,273 0,100 732 0,294 0,105 695
India 1990 0,064 0,096 580 0,004 0,097 573
Ireland 1981 0,198 0,139 598 0,027 0,269 222
Ireland 1990 0,078 0,135 549 0,162 0,148 486
Ireland 1999 0,086 0,127 519 0,124 0,138 461
Italy 1981 0,522 0,092 699 0,464 0,108 541
Italy 1990 0,292 0,092 1030 0,268 0,114 782
Italy 1999 0,092 0,082 1031 0,102 0,093 795
Japan 1990 0,322 0,127 469 0,237 0,133 429
Continues on next page
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Table 2 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country Year SE Std Error Obs SE Std Error Obs
Latvia 1990 0,099 0,224 697 0,113 0,224 685
Latvia 1999 -0,327 0,298 455 -0,462 0,316 430
Lithuania 1990 0,552 0,265 677 0,588 0,285 650
Lithuania 1999 -0,583 0,244 513 -0,663 0,291 447
Luxembourg 1999 0,363 0,220 589 0,469 0,285 342
Malta 1983 0,520 0,301 205 1,023 0,471 147
Malta 1999 -0,029 0,182 464 -0,145 0,206 352
Mexico 1990 -0,170 0,106 563 -0,172 0,107 541
Netherlands 1981 0,267 0,211 480 0,089 0,261 350
Netherlands 1990 0,445 0,305 432 0,389 0,334 358
Netherlands 1999 0,489 0,130 631 0,495 0,138 597
Nigeria 1990 0,063 0,149 226 -0,029 0,156 203
North Ireland 1981 0,670 0,371 165 -0,300 0,163 36
North Ireland 1990 1,242 0,495 156 0,945 0,674 122
North Ireland 1999 0,130 0,141 464 0,142 0,173 340
Norway 1982 0,263 0,119 713 0,300 0,127 684
Norway 1990 0,215 0,108 845 0,314 0,118 741
Poland 1989 -0,173 0,122 477 -0,232 0,123 474
Poland 1990 -0,075 0,116 567 -0,144 0,120 548
Poland 1999 -0,463 0,143 506 -0,475 0,144 495
Portugal 1990 0,224 0,129 611 0,188 0,132 585
Portugal 1999 0,237 0,141 442 NA NA NA
Romania 1993 0,055 0,179 551 -0,019 0,179 551
Romania 1999 0,296 0,227 416 0,285 0,238 388
Russia 1999 0,113 0,164 1310 0,091 0,176 1235
Slovakia 1990 0,109 0,515 321 0,067 0,516 320
Slovakia 1991 0,267 0,224 708 0,166 0,234 672
Slovakia 1999 0,244 0,165 754 -0,021 0,182 707
Slovenia 1992 0,270 0,202 567 0,192 0,204 561
Slovenia 1999 -0,085 0,208 527 0,080 0,332 366
South Africa 1990 0,192 0,099 1056 0,206 0,104 927
Spain 1981 0,277 0,074 984 0,271 0,077 897
Spain 1990 0,293 0,067 1624 0,276 0,074 1375
Spain 1999 0,299 0,131 478 0,092 0,175 319
Sweden 1982 0,327 0,150 651 0,338 0,160 619
Sweden 1990 0,408 0,133 770 NA NA NA
Sweden 1999 0,709 0,233 634 0,626 0,240 621
Turkey 2001 -0,078 0,118 369 -0,058 0,119 369
UK 1981 0,737 0,224 678 0,590 0,262 509
UK 1990 0,592 0,129 838 0,593 0,153 657
UK 1999 0,312 0,210 434 0,146 0,244 318
Ukraine 1999 -0,097 0,330 585 -0,129 0,332 571
US 1982 0,506 0,230 1317 0,577 0,238 1262
US 1990 0,359 0,161 1082 0,321 0,168 1016
Note: This table reports the results of ordered probit regressions of job satisfaction
on a dummy equal 1 if the individual is self-employed. Columns (1) and (4) report
the estimated coe¢ cients. In columns (1)-(3), the controls are gender, age, age
squared, education, marital status. In columns (4)-(6), income is also included
in the controls. NA indicates that no observation on income is available for that
country in that year. Coe¢ cients signicant at the 5% level are reported in bold.
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Table 3: Partial Correlations
HAPPY RICH POOR FD GDP
HAPPY 1
RICH -0.0275* 1
POOR 0.0867* -0.1671* 1
FD 0.3296* -0.1122* 0.0608* 1
GDP 0.2983* -0.1913* 0.0255* 0.6476* 1
Note: The table reports partial correlation coe¢ cients.
The star indicates signicance at the 1% level. HAPPY
is a dummy equal 1 if the coe¢ cient on self-employment is
positive and signicant at the 5% level in a ordered probit re-
gression with job satisfaction as dependent variable. RICH
is a dummy equal 1 if the coe¢ cient on self-employment is
positive and signicant at the 5% level in a ordered pro-
bit regression with income as dependent variable. POOR
is a dummy equal 1 if the coe¢ cient on self-employment is
negative and signicant at the 5% level in a ordered probit
regression with income as dependent variable. All regres-
sions include gender, age, age squared, education, marital
status as controls.
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Table 4: Financial Development and Job Satisfaction: Basic results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FD*SE 0.4932*** 0.3091** 0.4535*** 0.4391*** 0.3829***
(0.1074) (0.1390) (0.1109) (0.1310) (0.1308)
BANK*SE 0.0278**
(0.0141)
GDP*SE 0.0101** 0.0103***
(0.0047) (0.0035)
GROWTH*SE -0.0112
(0.0082)
UNEMP*SE 0.0048
(0.0087)
REGULAT*SE 0.0657
(0.0402)
SE 0.3679*** 0.0496 0.0426 0.1095 0.0625 -0.2306 0.0823
(0.0478) (0.0910) (0.0916) (0.1015) (0.1519) (0.1984) (0.0900)
Female 0.0004 0.0028 0.0077 0.0057 -0.0089 0.0063 0.0050
(0.0233) (0.0253) (0.0258) (0.0261) (0.0295) (0.0253) (0.0250)
Age 0.0040 0.0036 0.0026 0.0032 0.0021 0.0036 0.0031
(0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0063) (0.0046) (0.0043)
(Age)2 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0002** 0.0001*** 0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Married 0.1870*** 0.1904*** 0.1905*** 0.1905*** 0.1817*** 0.1884*** 0.1854***
(0.0257) (0.0281) (0.0283) (0.0285) (0.0311) (0.0285) (0.0278)
Education 0.0305*** 0.0309*** 0.0312*** 0.0323*** 0.0302*** 0.0306*** 0.0307***
(0.0067) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0080) (0.0073) (0.0071)
Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 50510 46873 45996 45550 34836 45855 46353
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions with job satisfaction as dependent variable. All
regressions include country-year dummies. The coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors for FD*SE
are multiplied by 100. The coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors for GDP*SE are multiplied by
1000. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-employment status level, are in brackets. , 
and  denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coe¢ cient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1%
signicance level, respectively.
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Table 5: Financial Development and Job Satisfaction: Non-linear e¤ects
Sample Low FD High FD Low GDP High GDP Low EMPL High EMPL Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FD*SE 0.8217** 0.0747 0.3759* 0.2557 0.5120** 0.1477 2.4467***
(0.3476) (0.2238) (0.2124) (0.1896) (0.2546) (0.1779) (0.8745)
GDP*SE 0.0120 0.0063 0.0387*** -0.0127 0.0052 0.0129* 0.0084*
(0.0074) (0.0056) (0.0100) (0.0130) (0.0055) (0.0067) (0.0047)
(FD*SE)2 -2.5535**
(1.0127)
(FD*SE)3 0.8337**
(0.3308)
SE -0.1703 0.3164 -0.1517 0.5758* -0.0362 0.1401 -0.3846*
(0.1370) (0.2067) (0.1173) (0.2989) (0.1392) (0.1628) (0.2025)
Female 0.0262 -0.0126 0.0148 -0.0013 0.0030 0.0140 0.0072
(0.0389) (0.0293) (0.0468) (0.0273) (0.0360) (0.0352) (0.0260)
Age 0.0080 -0.0026 -0.0031 0.0067 -0.0003 0.0064 0.0025
(0.0072) (0.0061) (0.0079) (0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0085) (0.0044)
(Age)2 0.0001 0.0002*** 0.0002** 0.0001* 0.0002*** 0.0001 0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Married 0.1951*** 0.1848*** 0.2095*** 0.1744*** 0.2255*** 0.1332*** 0.1902***
(0.0383) (0.0371) (0.0460) (0.0354) (0.0370) (0.0404) (0.0283)
Education 0.0392*** 0.0238** 0.0563*** 0.0114* 0.0474*** 0.0048 0.0313***
(0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0129) (0.0061) (0.0095) (0.0076) (0.0072)
Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 23359 22637 20989 25007 28737 17259 45996
R-squared 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions with job satisfaction as dependent variable. All
regressions include country-year dummies. In columns (1)-(2), Low FD and High FD indicate that the
sample is restricted to countries respectively below and above the median value of FD in our sample (equal
to 71.78). Similarly, in columns (3)-(4), Low GDP and High GDP indicate that the sample is restricted to
countries respectively below and above the median value of GDP in our sample (equal to 11,346); and in
columns (5)-(6), Low EMPL and High EMPL indicate that the sample is restricted to countries respectively
above and below the median value of UNEMPL in our sample (equal to 8.2). The coe¢ cient estimates and
the standard errors for FD*SE are multiplied by 100. The coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors for
GDP*SE are multiplied by 1000. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-employment status level,
are in brackets. ,  and  denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coe¢ cient being equal to 0 at
10%, 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively.
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Table 6: Financial Development and Job Satisfaction: Mechanisms
Sample Full Low FD High FD Full Low FD High FD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FD*SE 0.9113** -0.0249 0.4510 0.1818
(0.3576) (0.2366) (0.3431) (0.2117)
GDP*SE 0.0153* 0.0090 0.0136 0.0124***
(0.0079) (0.0058) (0.0087) (0.0045)
Income 0.1037*** 0.1142*** 0.0944***
(0.0097) (0.0135) (0.0145)
Independence 0.3418*** 0.3287*** 0.3513***
(0.0089) (0.0123) (0.0124)
SE 0.3259*** -0.2866** 0.3645* -0.3372*** -0.7240*** -0.6136***
(0.0506) (0.1347) (0.1858) (0.0471) (0.1442) (0.1873)
Female 0.0001 0.0325 -0.0170 0.1067*** 0.1444*** 0.0772**
(0.0250) (0.0433) (0.0292) (0.0216) (0.0336) (0.0308)
Age 0.0031 0.0056 -0.0037 -0.0181*** -0.0155** -0.0241***
(0.0045) (0.0082) (0.0061) (0.0042) (0.0062) (0.0067)
(Age)2 0.0002*** 0.0001 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Married 0.1111*** 0.1175** 0.1012** 0.1186*** 0.1409*** 0.1070***
(0.0292) (0.0454) (0.0414) (0.0239) (0.0331) (0.0360)
Education 0.0114* 0.0198* 0.0036 -0.0197*** -0.0179** -0.0181**
(0.0058) (0.0099) (0.0083) (0.0055) (0.0087) (0.0079)
Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 43873 20526 18976 50049 23107 22519
R-squared 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.23 0.23 0.24
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions with job satisfaction as dependent
variable. All regressions include country-year dummies. Low FD and High FD indicate that
the sample is restricted to countries respectively below and above the median value of FD
in our sample (equal to 71.78). The coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors for FD*SE
are multiplied by 100. The coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors for GDP*SE are
multiplied by 1000. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-employment status
level, are in brackets. ,  and  denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coe¢ cient
being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively.
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Table 7: Financial Development and Income
Sample Low FD High FD Full Low FD High FD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FD*SE -0.4107** -1.3760*** -0.0027
(0.1956) (0.3989) (0.4473)
GDP*SE 0.0027 0.0087 0.0022
(0.0059) (0.0084) (0.0094)
SE 0.2935*** 0.1183 0.4228*** 0.7426*** 0.0473
(0.0728) (0.0823) (0.1082) (0.1273) (0.3842)
Female -0.1175*** -0.0391 -0.0625 -0.1222*** 0.0063
(0.0360) (0.0567) (0.0395) (0.0369) (0.0642)
Age -0.0042 0.0094 0.0071 -0.0046 0.0202
(0.0161) (0.0164) (0.0139) (0.0163) (0.0193)
(Age)2 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Married 0.7280*** 0.9110*** 0.8770*** 0.7369*** 1.0272***
(0.1318) (0.1231) (0.0960) (0.1312) (0.1270)
Education 0.2202*** 0.2172*** 0.2289*** 0.2214*** 0.2373***
(0.0136) (0.0185) (0.0110) (0.0137) (0.0199)
Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 20976 22897 39502 20526 18976
R-squared 0.35 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.29
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions with income as de-
pendent variable. All regressions include country-year dummies. Low FD and
High FD indicate that the sample is restricted to countries respectively below
and above the median value of FD in our sample (equal to 71.78). The co-
e¢ cient estimates and the standard errors for FD*SE are multiplied by 100.
The coe¢ cient estimates and the standard errors for GDP*SE are multiplied
by 1000. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-employment status
level, are in brackets. ,  and  denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the
coe¢ cient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively.
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